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Two-person non-constant-sum games of-
fer an opportunity to study mixed-motive
conflict in the context of controlled labora-
tory experiment. As is typically the case,
the advantages of tractability and control
are offset by the artificiality of the labora-
tory environment. Extrapolation of labora-
tory results to conclusions about real life are
always hazardous and perhaps especially so
in the context of conflict. It is not only the
lack of realism of the situation depicted in
the laboratory which makes the extrapola-
tion unwarranted but also the limited range
of the results obtained. Let us suppose the
best, namely that to every experimental
game there corresponds some real life situa-
tion to which the conclusions obtained from
the experiments apply. Even in the simplest
case of the 2 X 2 game (two players with
two strategies each), there are at least eight
independent variables to vary (the eight
payoffs associated with each game matrix).
Giving each payoff just three distinct values
(low, medium, and high), we must perform
6,561 experiments to get a body of data for
a comprehensive description of how the
choices are influenced by the payoffs. Each
experiment, be it noted, must involve some
tens of subjects to give any confidence in
the results.
To be sure, some patterns may emerge
from only a fraction of this corpus, but the
relation of choices to the absolute payoffs
may not be the only nor even the main
relation of interest. The relation between
choices and the relative magnitudes of pay-
offs (comparing both the payoffs in the
different outcomes to the same subject and
the payoffs in the different outcomes to the
two subjects) may be of greater interest,
not to speak of other possibly very important
independent variables, such as the personal
characteristics of the subjects and the effects
of learning in iterated plays of a game.
The foregoing was meant to serve as a
warning against placing much faith in &dquo;bare-
foot empiricism&dquo;; that is, a program aimed
at acquiring some integrated knowledge
about situations of this sort by examining
large volumes of data, even if systematically
collected. Clearly some theoretical guidance
is needed to make sense of the data. It goes
without saying that experimentalists under-
stand this guiding role of theory and they
give evidence of this awareness in their
experimental design.
Examining the papers on experimental
games published in this journal since the
gaming section was established, we get an
impression of the sort of theoretical orienta-
tion which suggested the design of the
experiments. The orientation, as could be
expected, was strongly colored by the cen-
tral theme of this journal, namely conflict
1 This review was completed before the author
went on leave abroad, so that&mdash;with regard to
gaming articles in this journal&mdash;it covers only
those through Volume XI (1967).
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resolution. A substantial majority of the
experiments used the paradigm of the Pris-
oner’s Dilemma game or games closely
related to it. The reason is not far to
seek. This game has been most widely
publicized as a paradigm of a conflict situa-
tion in which individual interest dictates one
choice while collective interest dictates an-
other. Moreover, if both players are guided
by collective interest, each of them does
better in the outcome of the game than if
both are guided by individual interest.
Prisoner’s Dilemma, then, is the mixed-
motive game par excellence in which a
player faces the choice of &dquo;competing&dquo; or
&dquo;cooperating&dquo; and where the decision to
cooperate can be rationalized only on the
basis of assuming some sort of mutual trust
(in the absence of opportunities to make
binding agreements). Frequencies of co-
operative choices suggest a quantitative
measure of &dquo;the amount of cooperation.&dquo;
Measures of this sort, which seem to capture
an objective index of some previously only
intuitively understood personal or behavioral
characteristic, are always welcomed in ex-
perimental psychology.
This measure (the probability of choosing
C, the cooperative strategy in Prisoner’s
Dilemma) overshadows all other depen-
dent variables in the experiments reported.
Practically all of the experiments published
in this journal, then, seem to have been
directed to answer questions of this sort:
What has an effect on the frequency of the
C choice and to what extent? That is, what
factors tend to facilitate or to inhibit co-
operation ? As has been said, this is a natural
question to ask in the context of research on
conflict resolution, and, of course, it ought
to be asked. Unfortunately, the intense pre-
occupation with this question has obscured
other equally important potentialities of
gaming experiments.
The question &dquo;What factors inhibit or
facilitate cooperation?&dquo; has a direct appeal
in the sense that the relevance of the ques-
tion to real life situations involving conflict
resolution is immediately apparent. Further,
the circumstance that most of the inves-
tigators doing gaming experiments are psy-
chologists is responsible for the salience of
variables related to the &dquo;psychological set&dquo;
and to the personality of the player as
independent variables. Another favorite
independent variable has been the (pro-
grammed) strategy of one of the subjects
(who is then, naturally, a confederate of
the experimenter). In some of the experi-
ments, the experimental situation itself is
manipulated. All of these are examples of
what I shall call convergent designs. In
these designs one dependent variable (in
this case &dquo;the amount of cooperation&dquo;) is
held in a central position while the effects
on it of various manipulated or naturally
observed independent variables are studied.
An alternative to a convergent design is a
divergent design. Here a set of conditions
is held constant while a great many depen-
dent variables are examined. Only two or
three papers published in the gaming section
so far have been based on the principle of
the divergent design. Such a design reflects
a &dquo;natural history&dquo; approach to a given
experimental situation rather than a hy-
pothesis-testing approach. Let us see what
a divergent design actually involves.
The data obtained from a long iterated
sequence of choices in an experimental
game constitute a protocol. The protocol
exhibits a large body of statistics in which
the frequency of a particular response is
only one example. From a sufficiently large
protocol one can obtain a large variety of
such statistics; for example, conditional
frequencies of responses (i.e., frequencies
following any of the four possible outcomes
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of a 2 X 2 game), distributions of the
lengths of runs of any of the responses or of
the joint responses (i.e., the outcomes), the
interdependencies of the responses of the
two players, the systematic shifts of all of
these in iterated sequences (i.e., the learn-
ing effect of interactions between the
players), etc.
Naturally, all of these statistics are not
independent of each other. Indeed, if the
iterated game could be described as a
stochastic process, all of the statistics would
be theoretically deducible from the math-
ematical model of the process. Clearly, the
&dquo;divergent design&dquo; approach, i.e., the design
of an experiment so as to offer the pos-
sibility of estimating several statistics of a
population of protocols, lends itself best for
a test of a mathematical theory, in which
the various statistics would appear as de-
rived consequences of a mathematical model.
What would then be the connection be-
tween the mathematical theory and a psy-
chological theory of the process studied?
These connections would be suggested by
interpreting the parameters of the mathe-
matical model.
To take an example, suppose a finite state
Markov chain were chosen to represent the
stochastic process embodied in the iterated
game. Then a subject would be assumed
to be in one of a specified number of states.
It is natural to choose the outcomes as the
states (although in principle sequences of
outcomes could also be taken). Next, the
subject is assumed to make the one or the
other response with certain probabilities
which depend on the state in which he finds
himself. Combining the choice probabilities
of the two subjects, we obtain the transition
matrix of the Markov chain. All the statis-
tics of the process are now deducible. If
the estimate of the statistics obtained from
the protocols corroborate the model, we
have the beginnings of a theory. That is
because the parameters of the process,
namely, the conditional choice probabilities,
can be interpreted psychologically. They
are the propensities of the subject to do one
thing or another in the several situations in
which he finds himself. The corroboration
of the model involves the assignment of
values to these parameters. Now the in-
teresting problem arises of how these pa-
rameters change as independent variables
are manipulated.
In principle, this approach is no more
than a refinement of the single dependent
variable studies. For the parameters, e.g.,
the conditional probabilities, are essentially
breakdowns of a single variable (the fre-
quency of a response) into component parts.
However, the values of parameters of a
mathematical model can be expected to
reflect more faithfully whatever governs the
process than the values of grossly observed
variables, if only because the parameters are
the relatively constant characteristics of the
process, while the variables (such as re-
sponse frequencies) are subjected to the
dynamics of interaction. Thus, to take the
Markov chain as an example, even though
the transition probabilities are assumed to
be constant in the iterated game, the re-
sponse frequencies will be expected to
change, approaching asymptotic values.
There are serious limitations on the math-
ematical model approach. Ordinarily a
model of two interacting players will involve
a very large number of independent param-
eters. The estimation of such parameters is
a very laborious process. Nor does the labor
end with the estimation. If a behavioral
theory is to be built on the basis of a math-
ematical model of an iterated game, experi-
ments must be repeated with different sets
of independent (manipulable) variables in
order to ascertain how the changes are
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reflected in the values of the parameters
(always assuming that the basic mathemat-
ical model remains valid). In this way, even
with the guidance of a mathematical model,
the magnitude of a systematic experimental
program quickly becomes unmanageable.
For this reason, one might conclude that
an attempt to construct a serious mathe-
matical theory of even the 2 X 2 game
would be premature. Thus we are forced
to fall back on the &dquo;natural history ap-
proach,&dquo; i.e., designs where the independent
variables are limited to a few basic ones
(and consequently temptations to introduce
&dquo;fancy&dquo; variations in the experimental con-
ditions are resisted) but where the data
corpuses are large and subjected to intensive
study.
The following independent variables of a
2 X 2 game seem to me to be basic.
1. The payoff matrix. The psychologist
is understandably interested not in the pay-
off matrix per se but in what the payoffs
&dquo;mean&dquo; to the subjects; or, in game-theoretic
terms, in the utilities of the payoffs. The
problem of ascertaining utilities is a separate
and fundamentally different problem. Little
would be gained in pursuing this problem,
or in raising questions of whether the pay-
offs can have any meaningful analogues in
real life situations. If we decide to study
the 2 X 2 game intensively for its own sake
(the value of such study will be discussed
below), then the payoffs should be taken
simply as the givens of our study and results
should be related to them. It is advisable,
however, to standardize the range of the
payoffs in order to make the results of
various studies comparable.
Judging by results obtained so far, there
is little question that payoffs as monetary
rewards do act as incentives at least for the
subject populations studied. The range of
the payoffs could be roughly standardized
if the expected gains or losses were made of
the same order of magnitude as the fees
the subjects receive as participants in the
experiments. Fees are practically manda-
tory if some payoffs are negative, otherwise
the subjects can suffer real losses, which
can create problems. On the other hand,
it is not advisable to make all payoffs posi-
tive : some outcomes should be genuinely
&dquo;punishing.&dquo; Fees and payoffs can be so
calibrated that at worst the subject may
leave empty-handed and on the average
will come out with a modest supplement to
the subject fee.
If the eight payoffs of a 2 X 2 game are
allowed to vary independently and without
restriction, different types of games will
result. If the four payoffs accruing to each
of the players are all distinct, and if we
read them only on an ordinal scale, the
number of types is finite. In fact, there are
exactly 78 strategically nonequivalent 2 X 2
games. Analysis of the 78 matrices suggests
a classification of these 78 games into 12-15
categories depending on the existence of
one, two, or no equilibria, and on the &dquo;vul-
nerability&dquo; of these equilibria, i.e., on the
pressures resulting from departures from the
equilibria by one or the other of the players.
It is interesting to note that Prisoner’s
Dilemma is the only game in its category:
a game with a single so-called strongly
stable but Pareto-nonoptimal equilibrium.
Perhaps this is one of the reasons why this
game has received so much attention: its
uniqueness was somehow intuited.
Like Prisoner’s Dilemma, each of the
categories brings out specific motivational
pressures. For example, while in Prisoner’s
Dilemma there is a strong motivational pres-
sure against cooperation (since from the
point of view of the individual player non-
cooperation is more advantageous than
cooperation regardless of the other’s choice),
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in the closely related game of Chicken (a
&dquo;preemption&dquo; game), the pressure is am-
bivalent. It is more advantageous not to
cooperate if the other does, but to cooperate
if the other does not. An important feature
in Chicken is &dquo;preemption,&dquo; that is, a firm
commitment not to cooperate, which leaves
the other with the choice between &dquo;sub-
mitting,&dquo; as the lesser of two evils, or &dquo;resist-
ing&dquo; at an exorbitant cost to both. Other
games give players opportunities to com-
municate &dquo;threats.&dquo; These threats are ef-
fected by shifting away from equilibria.
They are calculated to induce the other
player to shift his choice rather than suffer
future losses due to such departures by the
first player. Still other games have &dquo;force
vulnerable&dquo; equilibria. A departure from an
equilibrium by one of the players actually
forces the other to shift (on the next play)
if he wants to improve his payoff.
Some of the games are symmetric in the
sense that the situations of the two players
are exactly the same; others are asymmetric,
permitting the study of behavior of players
whose situations in the game are different.
Finally, in each of the strategically non-
equivalent games, the magnitudes of the
payoffs can be varied without disturbing the
strategic structure of the game. Here it is
not the nature of the motivations but their
intensity which is the manipulated variable.
2. Time. Learning certainly takes place
in iterated plays if the outcome of each play
becomes known to the subject. A rather
stable feature of the Prisoner’s Dilemma
game is the tendency of the players to
&dquo;lock-in&dquo; either on the double-cooperative
or on the double-defecting outcome. Uni-
laterally cooperative outcomes tend to be-
come extinct in long iterations. The lock-in
effect is most clearly observable if the game
is played several hundred times.
In general, there is evidence that subjects
do not really &dquo;get the hang&dquo; of the game
until they have played it a hundred times or
so, with an opportunity to compare the
results of different &dquo;strategies,&dquo; these being
understood not simply as the two choices
available in the 2 X 2 game but as different
sequences of choices. However, the short-
term behavior of the subjects is also interest-
ing. In particular, it is interesting to see
the distribution of responses in one-shot
plays.
Experiments with one-shot (noniterated)
plays present a problem of design efficiency.
Since a decision in a 2 X 2 game takes only
a short time, it is extremely inefficient to
confine such an experiment to only one play,
i.e., to recruit a pair of subjects, to give
them instructions, etc., only to have them
actually perform for a few seconds. A
natural way out is to gather data from the
same pair on several different games, each
played once. This, however, raises another
problem. If the results of each play are fed
back to the subjects, they may develop some
&dquo;principles of play&dquo; abstracted from the
results. If these principles are applied
across all the plays in the experiment, the
responses may &dquo;contaminate&dquo; each other.
This is particularly noticeable if all the
games presented in an experimental session
are of the same type. For example, if all
the games are Prisoner’s Dilemma with
varying payoffs, the subjects may decide to
cooperate or not to cooperate in any such
game. In that case, the data will not dif-
ferentiate between the games with different
sets of payoffs, whereas this differentiation
may have been the original aim of the
experiment. Contamination of this sort can,
perhaps, be prevented by (a) mixing games
of widely different types in random se-
quence in a single experiment and (b) by
giving no information about the outcome
until all the games have been played. Thus,
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every play becomes a &dquo;first&dquo; play without
the intervention of learning, and a &dquo;prin-
ciple&dquo; is not easily transferable from one
play to another.
If the above method is used, the subjects
need not even be present at an experimental
session. Each subject can be given a stack
of cards, each representing a game matrix,
to take home with the instruction to indicate
his choice on each of the cards. It does not
matter how much time the subject spends in
making up his mind, nor whether he confers
with others. The purpose of the experiment
may well be to get a statistical distribution
of the responses where the respondents are
given the fullest opportunity to think about
each problem. The principal feature of most
non-constant-sum games is that they do not
have an unambiguously rational solution in
the form of noncooperative (nonnegotiable)
games; therefore it does not matter how
much time is spent in arriving at a decision.
In fact, the more time is spent, the more
the distribution of responses is likely to
reflect a &dquo;cultural norm.&dquo;
In short iterated runs, feedback about
outcomes is essential; hence the subjects
must be present in the experiment. In this
case only the first stratagem (mixing games
of widely disparate type) is available. The
principal question of interest here is how
the response pattern varies with the total
length of the iteration, say from two to ten
plays.
3. Subjects. The question of how choice
behavior in 2 X 2 games is related to the
personality of the subject was one of the
first ones raised in the context of these
experiments. The question is a legitimate
one, of course. Still, attempts to answer it
must be tempered by a number of caveats.
In iterated plays, interaction effects between
the two players play a major, sometimes a
decisive role. For instance, in long itera-
tions of Prisoner’s Dilemma, it has been
shown that the Pearson correlation coeffi-
cient of the frequency of choosing the C
response (across a population of pairs of
subjects) is in the high nineties. This high
correlation is, no doubt, a result of the lock-
in effect frequently observed in this game.
If lock-ins occur, this means that the uni-
lateral responses ( C1D2 ) and ( C2D1 ) are
rare. In fact, they tend to be gradually
eliminated in the course of the iteration. If
there were no unilateral responses, the cor-
relation would be 1.00. Because of these
high correlations, it makes no sense to look
for correlations between personality traits of
subjects and their performance within pairs.
If the performance of one subject is an
excellent predictor of the performance of
the other, no variance is left to be accounted
for by the personalities. It does make sense
to compare performances of independent
populations of subjects recruited from dif-
ferent pools. Here, again, however, some
approaches are more promising than others.
Although some interesting correlations have
been obtained between performances and
personality profiles (notably in Prisoner’s
Dilemma, where the propensity to cooperate
has been shown to correlate negatively with
measures of rigidity or &dquo;authoritarianism&dquo;),
still it would seem that attention would be
turned with more profit to obvious differ-
ences among populations (rather than dif-
ferences derived from paper and pencil
personality tests), such as sex, age, occupa-
tion, and above all, cultural background.
The spread of these experimental techniques
to several countries (as is already happen-
ing) may yield highly interesting results;
but this will come about only if a few
standard experimental designs are adopted
by investigators everywhere in order to
make comparisons meaningful.
4. Strategy of Other. The realization of
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the important role played by interaction in
iterated plays raises the important question
of how the pattern of responses of one sub-
ject depends on that of the other. The
question can be answered most directly if
the responses of one subject are subjected
to manipulation and control. This is accom-
plished by the use of a &dquo;stooge,&dquo; i.e., a
programmed pseudo-subject. The data so
far obtained are not always consistent. Some
experimenters have reported distinct de-
pendencies of the responses of the real
subject on the pattern of choices assigned
to the stooge; others have failed to find
such dependencies. The inconsistencies can
be attributed to a lack so far of massive,
persistent, and systematically standardized
investigations. The range of patterns of
choices in an iterated game is enormous,
and it is not surprising that little can be
seen by comparing the effects on the subject
of a few more or less haphazardly selected
programmed strategies. This is particularly
true if the programmed strategies are &dquo;non-
contingent,&dquo; for example, if the stooge is
assigned a random sequence of C and D
choices, in which only the relative frequency
of C is the controlled variable. It may well
be that within very wide limits the relative
frequency of C has no appreciable effect,
if the occurrence of the C responses is
random. The subject cannot discern a pat-
tern in the responses of his partner-op-
ponent and so is not guided by it. On the
other hand, it has been reported rather
consistently that simple contingent strat-
egies, particularly a tit-for-tat strategy on
the part of the stooge, tend to push the
subject toward cooperation. This suggests
that variations in contingent strategies may
be of greater importance than variations in
noncontingent strategies.
An important exception is the use of the
100 percent cooperative strategy on the part
of the stooge in the game of Prisoner’s
Dilemma. The distribution of C responses
among the real subjects tends to be bimodal
in this case, as if the subjects differentiated
into two classes, those who exploit the
cooperation of the other and those who
respond to it by cooperation.
So far, practically the only results ie-
ported involving the use of a stooge have
been on the Prisoner’s Dilemma game. It
is likely that the extension of this method
to other 2 X 2 games will yield much richer
results because of the greater variety of
motivating factors built into the structure
of those games. To take an example, com-
pare Prisoner’s Dilemma with the game of
Chicken in the case where the stooge con-
sistently uses the D (noncooperative) strat-
egy. In Prisoner’s Dilemma, there is only
one rational response to such persistent use
of D, namely D. If it is not likely that the
other will cooperate, there is nothing to do
but reciprocate with noncooperation if large
losses are to be avoided. This is not so in
the game of Chicken. The short-term ra-
tional response to D in that game is C, to
avoid the even larger loss in (DD). How-
ever, this sort of response produces strong
counter-pressures, because it is tantamount
to submission. Thus a shift to D can be
rationalized (if the punishment for double-
defection is not too strong) as a means of
&dquo;teaching him a lesson&dquo; even at the expense
of a loss to oneself.
Still other games, in which departures
from the &dquo;natural outcomes&dquo; can be inter-
preted as threats or the acceptance of tem-
porary losses in order to induce the other
to shift his strategy, offer additional oppor-
tunities for studying the possibly complex
effects of different programmed strategies.
In summary, these four classes of manip-
ulable variables seem to be important in
the sense of a promise of interesting and
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theoretically interpretable results: ( 1 ) the
payoff structure of the game matrix; (2)
the number of plays; (3) the subject pop-
ulation ; (4) a controlled (programmed)
strategy of one subject.
As has been said at the outset, while it
is desirable to keep the independent var-
iables few and standardized, attention ought
to be directed at a great variety of depend-
ent variables, instead of confining it to the
most obvious in the case of Prisoner’s Di-
lemma, namely the frequency of cooperative
responses. Since the distinction between
cooperation and noncooperation is not
nearly as clear in some other 2 X 2 games,
the extension of the experiments to these
games will also turn the attention of the
investigators to other dependent variables.
Even in Prisoner’s Dilemma, however,
there is a great variety of dependent var-
iables which should be studied in detail.
Foremost among these are the conditional
frequencies of response. In a more general
context, these can be expressed as the &dquo;shift
propensities&dquo; in each of the four outcomes
of the game. The shift propensity is defined
as the probability of shifting one’s strategy
given the outcome of a play of the game.
In terms of the conditional propensities to
cooperate in Prisoner’s Dilemma, these can
be defined in the following way:
~: the propensity to shift when the out-
come is (CC), which is the complement of
x, the propensity to cooperate when that
outcome obtains.
t/~ the propensity of player 1 to shift
when the outcome is (CD), which is the
complement of y, the propensity to coop-
erate when that outcome obtains.
z: the propensity of player 1 to shift
when the outcome is (DC), which is iden-
tical with the propensity to cooperate when
that outcome obtains.
tv: the propensity to shift when the out-
come is (DD), which is identical with the
propensity to cooperate when that outcome
obtains.
The complements of the shift propen-
sities, namely x, y, z, and i-v respectively,
are, of course, measures of the propensity
to persist in the corresponding outcomes.
We can now ask questions about what these
propensities (to shift or to persist) depend
on. The most simple-minded hypothesis
would relate these propensities to the pay-
offs to the player in question associated
with the outcomes. However, in Prisoner’s
Dilemma it has been definitely shown that
the two variables are not directly related.
For example, the propensity to persist in
(DD) is as a rule greater than the propen-
sity to persist in (DC), in spite of the fact
that the payoff to the first player is larger
in the latter outcome.
One is then led to the next simplest hy-
pothesis, namely that the shift propensities
are related to the change in payoff which
can be effected by shifting. Here the actual
magnitudes of the payoffs, not just the order
of the magnitudes, is the decisive factor.
As far as I know, this hypothesis has not
yet been put to a test.
It should be noted that the search for
correlations between the conditional prob-
abilities of response and the payoff structure
should be more rewarding than a search for
correlations between the unconditional prob-
abilities and the payoff structure, if only
because the former are more stable during
the course of the iterated game than the
latter, which are subject to strong inter-
action effects. In general, it makes the more
sense to seek correlations between indices
of behavior and independent variables, the
more stable these indices are. The construc-
tion of stochastic models of response pro-
tocols should be directed toward the dis-
covery of such stable indices.
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Another dependent variable of interest
is the distribution of the lengths of runs of
various outcomes. A cumulative distribution
(the fraction of runs having at least a given
length) which is exponential would corrobo-
rate a null hypothesis, namely that shifts
occur entirely at random. An examination
of these distributions in iterated Prisoner’s
Dilemma shows systematic departures from
the exponential distribution. These depar-
tures are strongly suggestive. That is, if the
distribution is &dquo;stronger&dquo; than the exponen-
tial (i.e., if the exponent turns out to be a
convex downward function of time), this
indicates that the longer a run lasts, the
more likely is a shift away from it. On the
contrary, if the distribution is weaker than
the exponential (i.e., if the exponent turns
out to be a convex upward function of
time), a lock-in effect is evident: the more
an outcome persists, the more it is likely to
persist further. In estimating these distribu-
tions it is not permissible to lump data from
several pairs of subjects, because this may
confound the genuine effect with the effect
of &dquo;natural selection.&dquo; For example, the
distributions of both the (CC) runs and of
the (DD) runs in massed data on Prisoner’s
Dilemma show strong persistence effects.
But these are partially accounted for by the
fact that, as the runs become longer, the
pairs which do not persist in those runs are
eliminated from the sample, leaving the
persistent pairs. This error can be circum-
vented by taking averages of individual
distributions instead of distributions ob-
served in massed data.
In conclusion, there is much to be learned
about the dynamics of interaction in the
playing of iterated 2 X 2 games. It seems
desirable to obtain this knowledge by an
intensive study of such games in their own
right, postponing for the time being the
question of how relevant this knowledge
may be to an understanding of mixed-motive
conflicts in real life. To raise this question
in connection with every experiment may
lead to unwarranted conclusions (if one
makes rash extrapolations), or else to a
premature discouragement concerning the
value of the experimental method (if one
constantly keeps in mind the dangers of
extrapolation). What is worse, viewing the
laboratory method in terms of simulation oi
real life conflicts leads to designs which are
not guided by the inner logic of a systematic
investigation. A laboratory game cannot be
considered as a simulation of real life in the
sense that a wind tunnel is a simulation of
a real aerodynamic situation. In the latter,
the same physical laws are operating as
those of the simulated situation; in the
former this can never be assumed. The
value of the laboratory experiment in the
simple context of the 2 X 2 game is in the
opportunity it gives for building a system-
atic theory of that situation. What relation
that theory will have to real life conflicts
(if any) only time can tell-namely, when
the concepts emerging from the descriptive
theory of the 2 X 2 game have become
stabilized as concepts of proven theoretical
power. Such has been the history of every
science which began life in the laboratory.
The laboratory phase ought to be considered
as the incubation period of a science. The
conditions in the incubator are generally
designed not to simulate realistically the
conditions of the environment in which the
adult organism will live, but rather to give
the incubating organism the best chance to
come to life.
Having indicated my personal bias in
choosing research strategies for gaming ex-
periments, I would like to dispel any impres-
sion that &dquo;realistic&dquo; simulations of conflict
in the laboratory should be discouraged.
The enlarged dilemma games (i.e., Pilisuk’s
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disarmament games), &dquo;realistic&dquo; simulations
of the game of Chicken and of nuclear
deterrence (e.g., the games used by M.
Deutsch and his associates), games which
simulate &dquo;pacifist resistance&dquo; (e.g., those of
Shure and Meeker) are all valuable vehicles
for demonstrating situations of this sort.
They also offer an opportunity for generat-
ing hypotheses concerning the effects on
behavior of the psychological sets induced
by the structure of the situations. The
results of these experiments are often richly
suggestive. The problem of how to pass
from these suggestions to a defensible theory
of conflict remains a difficult one, because
the &dquo;realism&dquo; of the simulation precludes a
reduction of the gaming experiment to a
standardized, tractable format. As a con-
sequence, results obtained in different simu-
lations (which sometimes contradict each
other) cannot be meaningfully compared.
For this reason, a substantial portion of
experimental gaming effort ought to be
devoted to the simplest formats, which alone
make possible a systematic build-up of a
theory. The relevance of this theory to a
general theory of conflict is a question which
can be posed only after the theory has been
constructed.
,
